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In the new digital age, information is available in large quantities. Since information consumes
primarily the attention of its recipients, the scarcity of attention is becoming the main limiting
factor. In this study, we investigate the impact of advertisement pressure on a cultural market where
consumers have a limited attention capacity. A model of competition for attention is developed and
investigated analytically and by simulation. Advertisement is found to be much more effective when
attention capacity of agents is extremely scarce. We have observed that the market share of the
advertised item improves if dummy items are introduced to the market while the strength of the
advertisement is kept constant.
I. MARKETS
Traditionally every product or service has a price tag.
In order to get it, one has to pay the price. Nowa-
days, the price of items in some markets becomes so
low, even to the point of free-of-charge, that this con-
cept of “pay-to-get” is challenged, especially in the era
of Internet. It is quite a common fact that one can get
many products and services paying absolutely nothing.
Among these are internet search (Google, Yahoo), email
(Gmail, Hotmail), storage (DropBox, Google, Yahoo),
social networks (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), movie
storage (Youtube), communication (Skype, WhatsApp),
document formats (PDF, RTF, HTML), various software
platforms (Linux, LaTeX, eclipse, Java) and recent trend
in education (open course materials and massive open
online courses (MOOC)).
Companies providing services, where their users pay no
money at all, is difficult to explain in Economics. Even
if these products are free to its user, there is still a sound
business plan behind them. To obtain a large market
share is the key in their business plan as in the cases
of Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, or Skype. Once they be-
come widely used, the company starts to use its customer
base to create money.
A. New market concepts
In order to understand such markets new concepts such
as two-sided markets and attention economy are devel-
oped. In a two-sided market, a company acts as a bridge
between two different type of consumers [1]. It provides
two products: one is free and the other with a price.
Free products are used to capture the attention. Prod-
ucts with price are used to monetize this attention. A
set of very interesting examples of two-sided markets in-
cluding credit cards, operating systems, computer games,
stock exchanges, can be found in ref [1].
Suppose there are many competing products at the free
side of a two-sided market. In theory, a customer can
get all the products available. In practice, this is hardly
the case. Abundance of immediately available products
can easily exceed customers capacity to consume them.
One way to look at this phenomenon is that products
compete for the attention of the users, which is referred
as attention economy in the literature [2–4].
Attention scarcity due to the vast amount of imme-
diately available products is also the case for cultural
markets. In a cultural market, it is assumed to have an
infinite supply for cultural products and it is assumed
that individual consumption behaviour is not indepen-
dent of other’s consumption decisions [5, 6].
B. Compulsive markets
We focus on markets, that are slightly different, where
customer compulsively purchases the item once he is
aware of it. Clearly, this kind of compulsive buying be-
havior cannot happen for high priced items such as cars
or houses. On the other hand, it could be the case for
relatively low priced items such as movie DVDs or music
CDs. This pattern of “compulsive purchasing” behavior
becomes clearly acceptable, if the items become free as
in the case of web sites, video clips, music files, and free
softwares, especially free mobile applications. There are
a number of services that provide such items including
Youtube, Sourceforge, AppStore.
We will call such markets as compulsive markets and
we consider the dynamics of the consumers rather then
the economics of it. These new kind of markets call for
new models. In this work, the Simple Recommendation
Model of ref [7, 8] is extended to such a model. We
use the extended model to answer the following ques-
tions: Under which conditions advertisement mechanism
outperforms the recommendation process? How much
advertisement is enough to obtain certain market share?
We first present our analytic approach and then compare
it with simulation results.
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2II. BACKGROUND
A compulsive buyer becomes aware of a product in two
ways: (i) By local interactions within his social network,
i.e. by means of word-of-mouth. (ii) By global interac-
tions, i.e. by means of advertisement.
Word-of-mouth recommendations by friends make
products socially contagious. Research on social conta-
gion can provide answers to the question of how things
become popular. Gladwell states, ”Ideas, products, mes-
sages and behaviors spread like viruses do” [9]. He claims
that the best way to understand the emergence of fash-
ion trends is to think of them as epidemics. Infectious
disease modeling is also useful for understanding opin-
ion formation dynamics. Specifically, the transmission of
ideas within a population is treated as if it were the trans-
mission of an infectious disease. Various models have
been proposed to examine this relationship [6, 7, 10–14].
There exist recent works whose essential assumption is
the fact that an old idea is never repeated once aban-
doned [15, 16]. In other words, agents become immune
to older ideas like in the susceptible-infected-recovered
(SIR) model. However, behaviors, trends, etc, can occur
many times over and over again. In this case it can be
modeled as susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model.
In completely different context, limited attention and its
relation to income distribution is investigated [17].
A. Epidemic spreading
The study of how ideas spread is often referred to as
social contagion [18]. Opinions can spread from one per-
son to another like diseases. An agent is called infected
iff it has the virus. It is called susceptible iff it does not
have the virus.
Using the SIS model of epidemics, the system can be
modeled as a Markov chain. Consider a population of N
agents. Let Si be the state in which the number of in-
fected agents is i. The state space is composed of N + 1
states, {S0, S1, . . . , SN} with S0 and SN being the re-
flecting boundaries. The system starts with the state S0
where nobody is infected.
Let T = [tij ] be the (N+1)×(N+1) transition matrix
of the Markov chain where tij is the transition probabil-
ity from state Si to state Sj . As a result of a single rec-
ommendation, there are three possible state transitions:
The number of infected agents can increase or decrease
by one or stay unchanged. Such a system is called birth
death process [19]. Hence, T is a tridiagonal matrix with
entries given as
tij =

pi, j = i+ 1,
li, j = i,
qi, j = i− 1,
0, otherwise
where pi, li and qi are the transition probabilities.
Then the stationary distribution pi = [pi0 · · ·piN ]> of
the Markov chain can be obtained from its transition
matrix [19] which satisfies
pii =
i∏
k=1
pk−1
qk
pi0 and
N∑
i=0
pii = 1. (1)
B. Simple Recommendation Model
The Simple Recommendation Model (SRM ) reveals the
relation between the fame and the memory size of the
agents [7, 8]. The SRM investigates how individuals be-
come popular among agents with limited memory size
and analyzes the word-of-mouth effect in its simplest
form. The SRM differs from many previous models by its
emphasis on the scarcity of memory. In the SRM, agents,
that have a strictly constant memory size M , learn each
other solely via recommendations.
A giver agent selects an agent, that he knows, and
recommends to a taker agent. Since memory space is re-
stricted to M , the taker forgets an agent to make space
for the recommended one. This dynamics is called a rec-
ommendation which is given more formally in Sec. III C.
Note that (i) The selections have no sophisticated mech-
anisms. All selections are made uniformly at random.
(ii) Any agent can recommend to any other agent. There-
fore underlining network of interactions is a complete
graph. (iii) Taker has to accept the recommended, that
is, he has no options to reject.
In the SRM, no agent initially is different than the
other. So the initial fames of agents are set to be the
same where fame of an agent is defined as the ratio of
the population that knows the agent. Recommendations
break the symmetry of equal fames. As recommenda-
tions proceed, a few agents get very high fames while the
majority of the agents get extremely low fames, even to
the level of no fame at all. Once an agent’s fame becomes
0, that is, completely forgotten, there is no way for it to
come back. In the limit, the system reaches an absorbing
state where exactly M agents are known by every one,
i.e. fame of 1, and the rest becomes completely forgot-
ten, i.e. fame of 0. The SRM offers many possibilities
for extension. It is applied to minority communities liv-
ing in a majority [20]. A recent work extends forgetting
mechanism by introducing familiarity [21].
III. PROPOSED MODEL
In SRM, (i) the spread of information through out the
system is managed by recommendation only and (ii) the
results are obtained by simulations [7, 8]. In this article,
we propose Simple Recommendation Model with Adver-
tisement (SRMwA) that extends SRM in the following
ways: (i) In addition to recommendation, advertisement
pressure as new dynamic is introduced. (ii) Moreover, an
3analytical approach is developed as well as simulations.
Distinctively, by SRMwA, we investigate the conditions
under which social manipulation by advertisement over-
comes pure recommendation.
A. New interpretation for SRM
In the original model of SRM, agents recommend other
agents and the term of memory size is used for the num-
ber of agents one can remember [7, 8]. As one agent
is known more and more by other agents, his fame in-
creases. In the extended model of SRMwA, agents rec-
ommend items rather than agents. Since items consume
the limited attention of agents, there is a competition
among items for attention. For these reasons, we pre-
fer to use the term of “attention capacity” in spite of
the term memory size for the number of information an
agent can handle. The focus of the work is no longer the
fame of the agents but the attention competition among
items.
Note that the proposed model allows us to consider
items in a wider sense. Rather than a unique object such
as Mona Lisa of Leonardo, we consider items that are
easily reproduced so that there are enough of them for
everybody to have, if they wanted to. Therefore items
are not only products and services but also as political
ideas, fashion trends, or cultural products as in the case
of ref [6].
B. Advertisement
We extend the SRM to answer the following question:
What happens if some items are deliberately promoted?
Suppose a new item, denoted by a, is advertised to the
over-all population. At each recommendation, the taker
has to select between the recommended item r and the
advertised one a. The item that is selected by the taker
is called the purchased item, denoted by β.
C. Model
Adapting the terminology of SRM [7] to SRMwA, a
giver agent g recommends an item, that she already
owns, to an individual. The item and the individual are
called the recommended r and the taker t, respectively.
The taker pays attention to, that is, purchases, either the
recommended or the advertised item. When the atten-
tion capacity becomes exhausted, in order to get space
for the purchased item, an item f that is already owned
by the taker is discarded. The market share of an item is
defined to be the ratio of population that owns the item.
The SRMwA is formally defined as follows. Let N =
{1, 2, . . . , N} and I = {1, 2, . . . , I} be the sets of agents
and items, respectively. Let g, t ∈ N and r, f, β ∈ I∪{a}
represent the giver and the taker agents, the recom-
mended, the discarded and the purchased items, respec-
tively.
The attention “stock” of an agent i, denoted by m(i),
is the set of distinct items that i owns. We say agent
i ∈ N owns item j ∈ I iff j ∈ m(i). For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that all agents have the same
attention capacity M , that is, |m(i)| = M for all i ∈ N .
The attention capacity of an agent is limited in the sense
that no one can pay attention to the entire set of items
but to a small fraction of it, that is, M  I. Instead of
directly using M , we relate M to I by means of attention
capacity ratio, defined as ρ = M/I. Since 0 ≤ M ≤ I,
we have 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
The recommendation and advertisement dynamics
compete. The taker agent select either the recommended
or the advertised item as the purchased one. Let the ad-
vertisement pressure, p, be the probability of selecting
the advertised item as the purchased item.
The modified recommendation is composed of the fol-
lowing steps:
i) g is selected.
ii) t is selected.
iii) r ∈ m(g) is selected by g for recommendation.
iv) t selects β where β is set to a with probability p,
and to r with probability 1− p.
v) The recommendation stops if β is already owned
by t.
vi) Otherwise, f ∈ m(t) is selected by t for discarding
and β is put to the space emptied by f .
Note that all selections are uniformly at random. With
these changes, the SRMwA becomes a model for compul-
sive markets with advertisement.
D. Some special cases
In general, one expects that the market share of the
advertised item increases as advertisement get stronger.
Depending the strength of advertisement, there are a
number of special cases, the dynamics of which can be
explained without any further investigation.
i) No advertisement. Note that in the case of no
advertisement, the original SRM is obtained since
the purchased item is always the recommended
item, i.e. β = r. In this case, the advertised item
has no chance and its the market share is 0.
ii) Pure advertisement. When the taker has no
choice but get the advertised one, i.e. β = a, rec-
ommendation has no effect. In this cases after every
agent becomes a taker once, the market share of the
advertised is 1. Note that in this case the system
will stop evolving any further. Interestingly, this
is a different state than the absorbing states of the
SRM.
iii) Strong advertisement. In the case of very strong
advertisement, the taker almost always select the
4advertised item. Once all agents have the adver-
tised item, the market share of the advertised item
is 1 and the system becomes the SRM but with
attention capacity of M − 1.
IV. ANALYTICAL APPROACH
Note that SRMwA resembles epidemic spreading. We
explore epidemic spreading to explain SRMwA as far as
we can. Consider the advertised item as a virus. Agent
j is called infected iff it has the advertised item in its
attention stock, that is, a ∈ m(j) otherwise It is called
susceptible that is a /∈ m(j). Then the stationary distri-
bution pi provides the probability of the number of agents
owning the advertised item when the system operates in-
finitely long durations. Hence, the mean value of the
stationary distribution pi reveals our prediction for the
number of infected agents. In other words, the expected
number of agents that adopted the advertised item is the
mean value of this distribution. That is, using Eq. 1, one
obtains
< pi >=
N∑
i=0
ipii = pi0
N∑
i=0
i
i∏
k=1
pk−1
qk
.
Hence, the expected market share of the advertised item
becomes
< Fa >=
< pi >
N
where Fa is the market share of the advertised item.
A. Calculation of transition probabilities
In order to obtain the expected market share of the ad-
vertised item, we need to figure out the stationary distri-
bution pi, which, in turn, calls for transition probabilities
pi, li and qi.
Suppose the system is in Si and follow the steps of
recommendation process given in Sec. III C. The possi-
ble selections can be represented by a tree given in Fig. 1.
A path starting from the root Si to a leaf in the tree cor-
responds to a recommendation. The paths that increase
the number of infected agents are marked by a ⊕ sign at
the leaf. Similarly, recommendations resulting a transi-
tion of Si → Si−1 are marked by a 	. The remaining
paths that correspond to no state change are marked by
a .
Note that there three ⊕ and two 	 paths. Note also
that the correspondence between the levels in the tree
and the steps of recommendation given in Sec. III C. At
each level one particular selection is made and the corre-
sponding probability is assigned.
i) a ∈ m(g) level. The first level branching in Fig. 1
corresponds to the selection of infected or suscep-
tible giver. There are N possible agents to be se-
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FIG. 1: Tree diagram for possible selections.
lected as g. If system is in state Si, then the prob-
ability of selecting an infected giver is iN .
ii) a ∈ m(t) level. The second level branching is due to
the selection of infected or susceptible taker. Once
g is selected, there are N − 1 candidates left for
t. The probability of selecting an infected taker
depends on whether the selected giver is infected
or not. For example, in the right most path, g is
infected. So, the probability of selecting an infected
taker for this case is as i−1N−1 .
iii) r = a level. Now consider what the giver recom-
mends. Depending on the path, the giver could be
infected and could recommend the advertised item.
Then the probability of an infected giver recom-
mending a is 1M , since there are M items in its
stock.
iv) β = a level. The fourth level illustrates the taker’s
purchase decision. The taker agent either follows
the advertisement with probability p or he accepts
the recommended item with probability 1− p.
5v) r ∈ m(t) level. Let γ be the probability of r being
already owned by the taker agent. In this case, the
taker agent does not do any changes in her stock.
vi) f = a level. It is possible that a can be chosen to
be the forgotten.
The transition probabilities can be obtained from
Fig. 1 as
pi =
N − i
N(N − 1)
[(
N − 1− i
M
)
p+
i
M
]
, (2)
qi =
i(1− p)(1− γ)
N(N − 1)M
[
N − i+ (i− 1)(M − 1)
M
]
, (3)
li = 1− (pi + qi). (4)
Note that (i) These equations satisfy the expected bound-
ary conditions q0 = 0, and pN = 0. (ii) pi > 0 for all
i = 0, · · · , N − 1. (iii) qi = 0 for all i when p = 1 or
γ = 1. Therefore, for p = 1 or γ = 1, the system drifts
to SN and stays there forever.
B. Discussion on the value of γ
The stationary distribution can be obtained by means
of Eq. 1, Eq. 2 and Eq. 3. The only unknown in these
equations is γ, which is introduced in the fifth step of
recommendation given in Sec. III C. γ is defined as the
probability of recommended item to be already owned
by the taker agent. Unfortunately, γ cannot be obtained
analytically except for the extreme case ofM = 1. There-
fore, we should find ways to approximate its value.
A first order estimate for γ could be ρ = M/I, since
taker owns M item out of I in total. γ is close to 1,
when M is in the range of I, since every agent owns al-
most all the items. The situation is quite different for
M  I. Since every item initially has the same market
share, γ starts with a small value at the beginning. As
recommendations proceeds, we know that some items be-
comes completely forgotten [7]. Therefore γ increases as
the number of recommendations increase and becomes 1
when the systems reaches one of its absorbing state. In
this respect, γ can be interpreted as the degree of close-
ness to an absorbing state. In order to investigate near
absorbing state behavior, we set γ = max{0.5,M/I} in
our analytic results given in Fig. 2 (b) where 0.5 is arbi-
trarily selected.
C. Extremely scarce attention capacity
For the extremely scarce attention capacity of M =
1, γ can be evaluated. Consider the paths in Fig. 1.
For M = 1, the paths which contain a (M − 1)/M edge
become paths with zero probabilities. The only non-zero
probability path, involving γ, is the one terminating at
the left 	 leaf. In this path the giver does not know
the advertised item, a 6∈ m(g), while the taker does, a ∈
m(t). Since attention capacity is limited to 1, the giver
and the taker do own different items. Therefore, the
recommended item by the giver cannot be owned by the
taker. Hence, γ = 0.
For M = 1 and γ = 0, the equations Eq. 2 and Eq. 3
lead to
pi
qi
= 1 +
N − 1
i
p
1− p
for 0 ≤ i < N. For p 6= 0, pi/qi > 1. That means
for even very small positive advertisement, the system
inevitably drifts to the state SN and once SN is reached,
the system stays there forever since qN = 0. Note that
SN , which corresponds to the state where all agents own
the advertised item, is the unique absorbing state for this
particular case.
V. SIMULATION APPROACH
In order to simulate the model, a number of decision
have to be made. The simulations start in such configu-
rations that all I items have the same market share and
no agent knows the advertised item. So that system is
initially symmetric with respect to non-advertised items.
When to terminate the simulation is a critical issue. We
set the average number of interactions ν = 103. Since
there are N2 pairwise interactions among agents in both
directions, the total number of recommendations is set
to be νN2.
(i) We run our simulation for a population size of N =
100 and an item size of I = 100.
(ii) The behavior of the system strongly depends on
the attention capacity ratio ρ. We take ρ as a model
parameter and run simulation for various values of ρ.
(iii) The advertisement pressure p is another model
parameter. We use 10−1, 10−2, 10−3 and 10−4 for p.
VI. OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSION
We investigate the effect of the advertisement pressure
p and the capacity ratio ρ to market share Fa of the ad-
vertised item. In order to make a quantitative compari-
son of the simulation results, being in the top 5 percent
is arbitrarily set as our criteria. Let F5% denote the low-
est market share for an item to be in the top 5 percent.
Then, the advertised item is in the top 5 percent when-
ever Fa > F5%. Let Fmin be the minimum market share
among all the items.
In Fig. 2, the simulation results of Fa, averaged over 20
realizations and versus the analytical results of < Fa >
can be seen for each value of p ∈ {10−1, 10−2, 10−3, 10−4}
as functions of ρ. A number of observations can be made:
(i) The analytic results given in Fig. 2 (b) are in agree-
ment with the simulation results in Fig. 2 (a). Model
predictions on < Fa > can quantitatively reproduce the
simulation results of Fa although we use an approximated
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The market share of advertised item
as a function of attention capacity ratio by (a) simulation and
(b) analytic approaches. F5%, Fmin and the asymptote line
of ref [7] are given for comparison.
value for γ. We observe that for larger ν, the similarity
between analytical and simulation results gets even bet-
ter.
(ii) The curves of F5% in Fig. 2 (a) resemble that of
in ref [7], although advertisement is not the case for the
latter. Line y = 0.95x + 0.071, which is given as an
asymptote for F5% for large values of N in ref [7], is also
plotted in Fig. 2 (a) for comparison purposes.
(iii) Note that for ρ < 0.05, all Fa curves approaches
to 1 and F5% becomes 0. This is due to finite size effect.
At an absorbing state, there would be exactly the same
M items purchased by all the agents and the remaining
items are completely forgotten. For I = 100, ρ < 0.05
means that M < 5. That is, there is no space left for the
fifth item. Hence, in near absorbing state, the market
share of the fifth item, F5%, approaches to 0. On the
other hand, any promotion, i.e. p > 0, is enough to push
the advertised item into the top M items.
(iv) The minimum market share Fmin becomes 0, when
at least one item is completely forgotten. This occurs for
ρ < 0.35 in Fig. 2 (a) which is consistent with ref [7]. We
also observe that for larger ν, the advertised item leaves
smaller share of attention to others, that forces the zero
crossing of Fmin to occur at an higher level of ρ.
(v) As expected, a strong advertisement, i.e. p = 10−1,
easily gets the advertised item into the top 5 percent since
Fa curve for p = 10
−1 is always higher than that of F5%
in Fig. 2 (a) while a weak promotion such as p = 10−3
or 10−4 cannot. The case of p = 10−2 ≈ 1I+1 for I = 100
is interesting. For small and moderate values of ρ, i.e.
ρ < 0.6, the advertised item is in the top 5 percent except
for one point. For the large values of ρ, this is not the
case.
(vi) How agents allocate their attention, when the at-
tention capacity becomes a limiting factor? This is the
critical question for markets of attention economy. Con-
sider the extreme case of attention capacity M = 1,
which corresponds to ρ = 0.01 in Fig. 2 . In this case, sur-
prisingly, even a very small positive value of p is enough
for the entire population to get the advertised item, i.e.
Fa = 1, when M = 1. This observation is analytically
investigated in Sec. IV C.
A. Item size effect
We run new simulations with different item sizes of
I when N is fixed to 100. Let Fa(I = k) denote the
market share of the advertised item when I = k. Then
we accept Fa(I = 100) as the reference market share and
define relative market share RI=k with respect to I = 100
as follows
RI=k =
Fa(I = k)
Fa(I = 100)
.
In Fig. 3, we observe that for all k ∈ {100, 200, 300, 500},
RI=k ≥ 1 when p is fixed to 10−1 except for ρ = 0.01.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
ρ
R
I=
k
 
 
k=500
k=300
k=200
k=100
FIG. 3: (Color online) Effect of item size to the market share
of the advertised item for p = 10−1 is invesitgated as a func-
tion of attention capacity ratio.
7The case of ρ = 0.01 corresponds to M = 1 for I = 100.
As explained in Sec. IV C, Fa gets its maximum value of
1, for M = 1. That is why, RI=k ≤ 1 for ρ = 0.01.
We have observed that the market share of the ad-
vertised item improves while the number of items are
increased even if the advertisement pressure is kept con-
stant. In order to push market share up, increasing the
advertisement pressure, is not usully an option in practi-
cal life. This can be an interesting interpretation. If one
cannot increase the intensity of advertisement, i.e p, it is
better to have higher number of items, i.e. I. When that
happens, the advertised item have better chances to get
into the top 5 percent. In order to obtain this operat-
ing point, one may purposefully introduce some dummy
items. This unexpected prediction of the model needs to
be further investigated.
B. Closeness to the absorbing state
The system gets closer to one of its absorbing states as
the number of recommendations increases which is con-
trolled by simulation parameter ν. Let Fa(ν = k) be
the market share of the advertised item after νN2 rec-
ommendations. We define relative market share Rν=k at
ν = k with respect to ν = 102 as
Rν=k =
Fa(ν = k)
Fa(ν = 102)
.
The relative market share at ν = 103 is given in Fig. 4
for different values of p ∈ {10−1, 10−2, 10−3, 10−4} when
N = I = 100.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The relative market share of Rν=k at
ν = 103 is invesitgated as a function of attention capacity
ratio .
We consider the system stationary if Rν=k becomes 1,
that is, the system stops changing with ν. We observe
in Fig. 4 that as the attention capacity or the advertise-
ment pressure gets higher, model becomes closer to the
stationarity. More advertisement pressure is not so dif-
ferent than increasing the number of iterations. Both are
favorable for the market share of the advertised item.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The SRM as a model for pure word-of-mouth market-
ing is studied in ref [7, 8]. We extend the SRM to atten-
tion markets with advertisement. This model constructs
a theoretical framework for not only items but study-
ing the propagation of any phenomena such as ideas or
trends under limited attention.
The model is investigated analytically and by simula-
tion. The analytical results agree with the simulations.
As expected, strong advertisement forces every one to get
the advertised item in all conditions.
Interestingly, when the attention capacity is small com-
pared to the number of items, even a very weak adver-
tisement can do the job. This behavior is analytically
shown for the case of M = 1 and observed in the re-
sults of both simulations and analytic calculations as ρ
approaches to 0. This can be interpreted as when individ-
uals have limited attention capacity, they tend to adopt
what is promoted globally rather than recommended lo-
cally. We have also found that introducing more standard
items to the market, is good for the market share of the
advertised item. This observation may lead to interest-
ing political consequences in terms of public attention
and political administration. For example, public opin-
ion can be kept under control by means of increasing the
number of issues, possibly by means of artificial ones, so
that the promoted idea is easily accepted by large audi-
ences. This prediction calls for further investigation.
In this current work, there is a unique advertised item.
The model can be extended to cover more than one pro-
moted items. All selections are uniformly at random.
One may investigate the effects of some other selection
mechanism as in the case of ref [21]. We have a complete
graph as the graph of interactions. One can investigate
other graphs of interactions such as Scale-Free, Small-
World, regular or random graphs. The structure of in-
teractions can also be improved by introducing a radius
of influence. One may extend the model by introducing
the concept of quality for items or letting agents prefer
some items intrinsically as in ref [6].
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